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Plan to Attend Trust Accounting Seminars April 22 & 24, 2008
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Members of the Calgary Bar gathered on Stephen Avenue in Calgary for this large photograph on November 15, 2007. Photos can be ordered from the photographer, Ted Knude. Go to: www.lawsocietyalberta.com for more details.
Ethics in Practice: Signing Court Orders
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It appears that the duty to sign orders is linked to the role of lawyers as officers of the court.
Still, that feels somewhat unsatisfactory as an answer. Martin cited no precedent for the proposition and Folkes cited only Chrysler Credit, an equally unsupported case of an Ontario Master. Why then should the proper “conduct of legal proceedings” or the proper “processing of orders of the court” take precedence over the obligation of the lawyer to zealously represent the client? The client centered approach makes it seem that client autonomy is diminished and that, in this context, a lawyer is made a servant of the state rather than of the client.
An answer is partly found in the Rules of Court. Northwest Territories Rule 407(3) and Alberta Rule 322(2) both provide that orders and judgments of the court speak from the moment of pronouncement. Historically, this is probably the oldest rule in the book and explains the immediacy of “Off with his head!” in the time of court scribes. In Folkes, the appellant alleged that the court order was fraudulently back dated when in fact it only referred to the date of pronouncement. Chrysler Credit does rely on the Ontario equivalent Rule. A court order |
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becomes the law from that day forward, whether signed or not.
The pronouncement rule rationalizes the duty to sign orders already granted. However, the duty expressed by the courts draws no distinction between orders granted and orders merely agreed to by counsel. Former Practice Advisor Barry Vogel mused doubtfully in 2000 that a principle of ethics should perhaps prevail over the law of agency in this context but surmised that judgments of the court carried more weight than opinions of the Practice Advisor.
In the result, lawyers appear to have a positive duty to sign court orders which have been granted or agreed, in the absence of a valid objection and notwithstanding the subsequent instructions of the client. In the face of persistent instructions by the client to implement instructions contrary to professional ethics, a lawyer must consider whether to withdraw from the representation. In Folkes moreover, the duty extended beyond the retainer and would be owed even after ceasing to act but, in this respect alone, there may a real distinction from Martin and orders merely agreed to by counsel. | |